Appeals | Part VII of Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Introduction

The judicial process in India depends on the application of ‘judicial mind’ and ‘judicial reasoning’ to decide a dispute. This application of mind is made by the judge, who hears the case. A judge, though trained to decide such disputes while applying the correct law and expounding it too to fit into the facts, is ultimately a human being. There is a very famous saying, as ‘a man is to err’. As the whole judicial system depends on the human being, it is not immune to errors or mistakes. These errors can only be checked by way of giving the right of appeals to the parties to the suit. This points out the indispensability of ‘appeal’ and vitality of its proper functioning for a judicial system to survive.

In Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar, AIR 1974 SC 1126 it has been held that suit is inherent, general or common law right and it need not be provided by any statute, however, the appeal is a statutory right and is maintainable only when some statute provides the remedy of an appeal.

The statute which is talked here primarily refers to the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC” or “the Code”) which grants right to appeal in civil suits. This is a general law. Different Special law, provide different appellate courts, which decide cases, which are allotted to them through that special enactment.

Part VII of CPC and Order 41-45 of CPC deals with Appeals.

Abatement of Appeal

Abatement of a suit generally is a stage, where a legal proceeding is interrupted or suspended, and the plaintiff is prohibited from going forward with the lawsuit at that particular time. Abatement is available to a defendant through procedural pleadings and may be considered a defense. If a case is abated, the case will not continue until a judge gives the approval to resume the hearings. Abatements can be based on several objections raised by the defendants, but typically arise, when a prior action has already been initiated or when a party to the lawsuit has become deceased.

Order XXII of ‘The Civil Procedure Code, 1908’ (CPC), deals with the substitution of legal representatives and abatement of proceedings. Order XXII Rule 3 provides that in case the application for substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff/petitioner is not filed within the limitation prescribed by law, the suit/proceedings shall abate as against the said party. Order XXII Rule 4 deals with the procedure in case of death of one or several defendants or sole defendant and fixes the period of limitation to bring an application for substitution of legal representatives of the deceased defendant, failing which proceedings would stand abated. In case there are several defendants and only one dies, the proceedings would not abate qua the other defendants.

Generally, a case abates against the person who is dead and substitution of his legal representative is not made. Setting aside abatement requires a specific order under Order 22 Rule 11. (Madan Nayak v. Mst. Handubal Devi, AIR 1983 SC 676).

Sub-rule (4) of Rule 4 thereof provides for an exemption for substitution of the legal representatives where the defendants/ respondents have not filed the written statement or failed to appear and contest the suit and in such eventuality, the judgement can be pronounced against the said defendant notwithstanding the death of such a defendant and the judgement shall be enforceable, and have effect as if had been pronounced before the death took place (Zahirul Islam v. Mohd. Usman, 2003 1 SCC 476).

Sub-rule (5) of Rule 4 of Order 22 provides for condoning the delay in filing the substitution application of legal representatives of the deceased defendants in case the petitioner proves before the Court that he was ignorant about his death. Thus, the purpose is seeking an extension of time limit for substitution of legal representatives in such a circumstance. This provision is explained in Union of India v. Ram Charan, AIR 1964 SC 215.

In State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram AIR 1963 SC 89, while interpreting the provisions of Order XXII Rule 4(3) CPC read with Rule 11 thereof, the Apex Court observed that an appeal abates as against the deceased respondents where within the time limited by law no application is made to bring his heirs or legal representatives on record. However, whether the appeal stands abated against the other respondents also, would depend on the facts of a case.

In a case where the decree appealed against is joint and inseverable, the entire appeal stands abated (N. Khosla v. Rajlakshmi, AIR 2006 SC 1249). Where each one of the parties has an independent and distinct right of his own, not inter-dependent upon one or the other, nor the parties have conflicting interests inter se, the appeal may abate only qua the deceased respondent. However, in case, there is a possibility that the Court may pass a decree contradictory to the decree in favour of the deceased party, the appeal would abate in toto (in totality) for the simple reason that the appeal is a continuity of suit and the law does not permit two contradictory decrees on the same subject matter in the same suit. Thus, whether the judgment/decree passed in the proceedings vis-à-vis the remaining parties would suffer the vice of being a contradictory or inconsistent decree, is the ‘relevant test’ (Budh Ram & Ors. v. Bansi & Ors., 2010 (9) SCR 674).

Order XXII Rule 6 is an exception as it provides that there shall be no abatement of the proceedings in case the death occurs of either of the parties where the cause of action survives or not after the hearing of the case stands concluded. In N.P. Thirugnanam (D) by LRs v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 116, the Supreme Court explained the scope of the provisions of Order 22, Rule 6 holding that if the defendant dies after the conclusion of the arguments and the judgement had been reserved, the proceedings shall not abate and the decree against the dead person shall be executed. Order XXII Rule 10 A inserted by an amendment in 1976 creates an obligation on the part of the lawyer appearing for a party to inform the court about the death of his client, and the Court shall thereupon give notice of such death to another party.

In such a case there may be a delay in bringing the application for substitution of LRs and the Court may take a lenient view taking into consideration the date of knowledge of the death by the party filing an application for condonation of delay (Chaukas Ram v. Duni Chand (Dead) by proposed LRs, 2004 13 SCC 567).

Appeal by Indigent Persons

Order 33 of the CPC deals with suits filed by indigent persons. Explanation 1 of Rule 1 of Order 33, defines an indigent person, as a person who is not possessed of sufficient means (other than property exempt from attachment in execution of a decree and the subject matter of the suit) to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit; or where no such fee is prescribed, if he is not entitled to property worth one thousand rupees other than the property exempt from attachment in execution of a decree, and the subject-matter of the suit.

Explanation 2 provides that, any property which is acquired by a person after the presentation of his application for permission to use as an indigent person, and before the decision of the application, shall be taken into account into an account in considering the question whether or not an applicant is an indigent person. Explanation III provides, that there where the plaintiff sues in a representative capacity, the question whether he is an indigent person shall be determined with reference to the means possessed by him in such capacity.

Order XLIV of CPC deals with the appeal of indigent persons. Rule 1 provides that, any person entitled to prefer an appeal and is unable to pay the fee required for the memorandum of appeal, may present an application accompanied by a memorandum, and may be allowed to appeal as an indigent person. If the court rejects the application under rule 1, the Court may, while rejecting the application, allow the applicant to pay the requisite court-fee, within such time as may be fixed by the court or extended by it from time to time.

Rule 3, provides that if an applicant, who prefers an application under rule 1, was allowed to sue or appeal as an indigent person in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, no further inquiry in respect of the question whether or not he is an indigent person shall be necessary if the applicant has made an affidavit stating that he has not ceased to be an indigent person since the date appealed from. But, if the government pleader or respondent disputes the truth of the statements made in such affidavit, an inquiry into the question of ‘indigency’ of the applicant shall be held by the Appellate court, or under the orders of the appellate court, by an officer of that court.

In A.A. Haja Muniuddin v. India Railways (1992) 4 SCC 736, the court has observed that “Access to Justice cannot be denied to an individual merely because he does not have the means to pay the prescribed fee.”

In R.V. Dev v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of Kerala (2007) 5 SCC 698, the court has held that

“Order 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with suits by indigent persons whereas Order 44 thereof deals with appeals by indigent persons. When an application is filed by a person said to be indigent, certain factors for considering as to whether he is so within the meaning of the said provision are required to be taken into consideration therefor.

A person who is permitted to sue as an indigent person is liable to pay the court fee which would have been paid by him if he was not permitted to sue in that capacity if he fails in the suit at the trial or even without a trial. Payment of court fee as the scheme suggests is merely deferred. It is not altogether wiped off.”

Cross-Objections in Appeal

Where the decree passed is partly in favour of any party against the respondent and such decree is appealed from, the respondent can take objection to that part of the decree which is against him as he could have taken by way of a separate appeal. Such objections are called cross-objections and are filed in the form of a memorandum.

Rule 22 of Order 42 of Civil Procedure Code provides that, any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree but may also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour; and may also take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal provided he has filed such objection in the Appellate Court within one month, from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow.

Explanation provides that a respondent aggrieved by a ‘finding’ of the court in the judgement on which the decree appealed against is based may, under this rule, file cross-objections in respect of the decree in so far as it is based on that finding, notwithstanding that by reason of the decision of the Court on any other finding which is sufficient for the decision of the suit, the decree, is wholly or in a party, in favour of that respondent.

Unless the respondent files with the objection a written acknowledgement from the party who may be affected by such objection or his pleader of having received a copy thereof, the appellate court shall cause a copy to be served, as soon as may be after the filing of the objection, on such party or his pleader at the expense of the respondent. [O. 41, R. 22 (3)].

Powers of Appellate Court

First Appellate Court has got the power to judge the correctness of findings of facts as well as of law recorded by the Trial Court. However, Second Appeal to the High Court under Section 100 CPC lies only if the case involves a substantial question of law. Section 107 explicates law on Powers of Appellate Court. It states,

“107. Powers of Appellate Court – (1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an Appellate Court shall have power-

• To determine a case finally;
• To remand a case;
• To frame issues and refer them for trial;
• To take additional evidence or to require evidence to be taken.
• Subject as aforesaid, the Appellate court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this code on courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein.”

Section 112 of the Code saves other powers of the Supreme Court (As provided under the constitution or otherwise) from getting affected by this code. Section 151 saves ‘inherent powers’ of the court too.

Stay of Proceedings and Stay of Execution

Order 41 Rule 5, CPC states the relationship between the appeal on a stay of proceedings and execution. It provides that, an appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except so far as the Appellate Court may order, nor shall execution of a decree be stayed by reason only of an appeal, having been preferred from the decree. But, the Appellate Court may for ‘sufficient cause’ order stay of execution of such decree.

Also, no order for stay of execution can be made unless the court making it is satisfied that –

• That substantial loss may result in the party applying for a stay of execution unless the order is made;
• That the application has been made without unreasonable delay;
• That security has been given by the applicant for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding upon him.

The Court may also make an ex parte order for stay of execution pending the hearing of the application. The court may also direct the appellant to deposit some security for granting the stay of execution.

Under Order 21, rule 26, C.P.C. the court to which a decree has been sent for execution shall, upon sufficient cause being shown, stay the execution of such decree for a reasonable time, to enable the judgment-debtor to apply to the court by which the decree was passed or an appellate court for an order to stay the execution. Before making an order to stay the execution, the court may require such security from the judgment-debtor as it thinks fit.

Under rule 29 of the same Order the court may, on security or otherwise, stay the execution of a decree until the decision of the pending suit, filed by the judgment-debtor against the decree-holder.

Stay order in the appeal can be made conditional too, and if the condition is not complied with, stay order stands revoked/discharged but the appeal remains intact and has to be heard on merits. (Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. M/s. Federal Motors Pvt. Ltd., 2005 (1) SCC 705). But the condition attached to stay order must be ‘reasonable’.

In the case of the appellate court, in order for a stay of proceedings, such a stay cannot be in operation for more than 6 months, unless in exceptional circumstances, as has been held by the Supreme Court, in Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation (Criminal Appeal No. 1375/2013).

Remand by Appellate Court

According to Black’s Law Dictionary, Remand means, ‘the act or an instance of sending something (such as a case, claim, or person) back for future action.’

There are three provisions in the Code, which deal with the power of the Appellate Court to remand the case to the Trial Court. These provisions are order 41 Rules 23, 23A and 25.

Order 41 Rule 23, enables the Appellate Court to remand the case to the Trial Court when it finds that the Trial Court has disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point. The Appellate Court in such cases is empowered to direct the Trial Court to decide all the issues on evidence on record.

Rule 23A enables the Appellate Court to remand the case to the Trial Court when it finds that though the Trial Court has disposed of the suit on all the issues but on the reversal of the decree in appeal, a re-trial is considered necessary by the Appellate Court.

Rule 25 enables the Appellate court to frame or try the issue if it finds that it is essential to the right decision of the suit and was not framed by the Trial Court. The Appellate Court in such case, may, accordingly, frame the issues and refer the same to the Trial Court to take the evidence and record the findings on such issues and return to the Appellate Court for deciding the Appeal. In such cases, the Appellate Court retains the Appeal to itself.

Under Order 41 Rule 24, the code provides, that where the evidence upon the record is sufficient to enable the Appellate Court to pronounce the judgment, the Appellate Court may, after resettling the issues, if necessary, finally determine the suit.

In Syeda Rahimunnisa v. Malan Bi (Dead) by L.R. & Anr. Etc., Civil Appeal No. 2875/2010, Supreme Court held that, High court, while hearing a second appeal, has no jurisdiction to remand a case to the trial court, especially when no party to the appeal raised this ground before the first appellate court or/and the high court as to why the remand of the case to the trial court is called for and nor there was any finding recorded on this question by the first appellate court.

In R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple, AIR 2003 SC 4548, the court avoided remand, even though it was desirable, as the suit had been instituted 25 years before.

Appeal from Original Decree

Section 96 of the Code provides that the first way of challenging the decree, passed by a court exercising the original jurisdiction, is by filing an appeal in the court ‘authorized to hear appeals’ from the decisions of such court. It also provides that, an appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte, i.e., without hearing the other party. No appeal will lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties.

This kind of appeal is also known as ‘the first appeal’. It is permissible for the appellate court to re-examine and re-appreciate the evidence, in the first appeal. The right to institute the suit is an inherent right, but the right of appeal is statutory. (Baldev Singh v. Surendra Mohan Sharma, AIR 2003 SC 225).

In Delhi UP Madhya Pradesh Transport Co. v. New India Assurance Co., 2006 9 SCC 213, the Apex Court held that regular first appeal should not be dismissed summarily without assigning a proper reason.

Order XLI Rule 31 CPC elaborates on how the First Appellate Court must decide the appeal. It makes it mandatory for the court to mention in its judgment

• The points for determination
• The decision thereon;
• Reasons for the decision;
• Where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled.

the below-mentioned case emphasizes these guidelines for the appellate court to follow.

In H. Siddiqui (dead) by LRs v. A. Ramalingam, AIR 2011 SC 1492, the apex court held as under

“It must be evident from the judgment of the appellate court that the court has properly appreciated the facts/evidence, applied its mind and decided the case considering the material on record. It would amount to substantial compliance of the said provisions if the appellate court’s judgment is based on the independent assessment of the relevant evidence on all-important aspect of the matter and the findings of the appellate court are well-founded and quite convincing.

It is mandatory for the appellate court to independently assess the evidence of the parties and consider the relevant points which arise for adjudication and the bearing of the evidence on those points. Being the final court of fact, the first appellate court must not record a mere general expression of concurrence with the trial court judgment rather it must give reasons for its decision on each point independently to that of the trial court. Thus, the entire evidence should be done after formulating the points for consideration in terms of the said provisions and the court must proceed in adherence to the requirements of the said statutory. ”

Second Appeal

Section 100-103 of CPC deals with the second appeal. This part of the code contains provisions relating to appeal from ‘appellate decrees’ unlike from original decree. As the word ‘second appeal’ clearly denotes, it is an appeal filed against the order of an appellate court. Second here denotes the number of appeals, in laymen terminology. Section 100 provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. It must be noted that second appeal only lies on the substantial question of law, not on the question of facts.

In State Bank of India & Ors. v. S.N. Goyal, AIR 2008 SC 2594, the Supreme Court explained the term ‘substantial question of law’, by observing that,

“The word ‘substantial’ prefixed to ‘question of law’ does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions of law of general importance, but refers to impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lis between the parties. ‘

Substantial question of law’ means not only substantial questions of law of general importance but also the substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties. ….. any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A question of law which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing on the final outcome, will not be a substantial question of law.”

The High Court should not entertain a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code unless it raises a substantial question of law. In Panchu Gopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1041, the Court observed that while entertaining the second appeal, the Court should not overlook the change brought about by the Amendment act of 1976, restricting the scope of the second appeal drastically and now it applies only to appeals and formulated by the High Court. The existence of a substantial question of law is sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 100 of the code.

In Kondibu Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar & Ors. AIR 1999 SC 2213, the Apex Court held that second appeal cannot be decided merely on equitable grounds as it lies only on the substantial question of law. In Kashibai v. Parwatibai (1995) 6 SCC 213, the Court held that the High Court cannot appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of the facts in the second appeal unless the substantial question of law or a question of law duly formulated is to be decided. The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence.

In Jai Singh v. Shakuntala (AIR 2002 SC 1428), the Supreme Court held that it is permissible to interfere even on the question of fact but it has to be done only under exceptional circumstances.

There may be exceptional circumstances where the High Court is compelled to interfere, notwithstanding the limitation imposed by the wording of Section 100 CPC. It may be necessary to do so for the reason that after all the purpose of the establishment of the courts is to render justice between the parties, though the High Court is bound to act with circumspection while exercising such jurisdiction.

In the second appeal, the court frames the substantial question of law and at the time of admission of the appeal, the Court is required to answer all the said questions unless the appeal is finally decided on one or two of those questions, or the court comes to the conclusion that the questions framed could not be a substantial question of always. There is no prohibition in law to frame the additional substantial question of law if the need so arises at the time of the final hearing of the appeal. (Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin & Anr., 2012 8 SCC 148).

In P. Chandrasekharan & Ors. v. S. Kanakarajan & Ors. (2007) 5 SCC 669, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that interference in the second appeal is permissible only when the findings are based on a misreading of evidence or are so perverse that no person of ordinary prudence could take the said view.

Then, High Court can interfere with the finding of the fact while deciding the Second Appeal provided the findings recorded by the Courts below are perverse, as held in Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali, AIR 2010 SC 2679.

When deciding the second appeal, the court may also make a ‘finding a fact’ under section 103 of CPC. In Haryana State Electronics Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors. v. Seema Sharma & Ors. (2009 7 SCC 311), the court enumerated the conditions to be fulfilled by the court before exercising power under section 103. The conditions are:-

• Determination of an issue must be necessary for the disposal of appeal;
• The evidence on record must be sufficient to decide such an issue;
• (a) Such issue should not have been determined either by the trial court or by the appellate court or by both;

(b) Such issue should have been wrongly determined either by the trial court, or by the appellate court, or by both by reason of a decision on the substantial question of law.

The issue of the perversity of fact is itself a substantial question of law, and therefore, section 103 CPC can be held to be supplementary to Section 100 CPC and does not supplant it altogether. Reading it otherwise would render the provisions of Section 100 CPC redundant.

It is only an issue that involves a substantial question of law, that can be adjudicated upon by the High Court itself instead of remanding the case to the court below, provided there is sufficient evidence on record to adjudicate upon the said issue and other conditions mentioned therein stands fulfilled. Thus, the object of the Section is to avoid remand and adjudicate the issue if the findings of fact recorded by the courts below are found to be perverse. (Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab State Electricity Board & Ors., JT 2010 (11) SC 615).

Section 102 provides that no second appeal would lie where the subject matter of the original suit for recovery of money is not exceeding Rs. 25,000/-.

Appeal from Orders

An order which is passed pendente lite, that order (interim) can also be challenged in the appellate court if it falls under categories given under Section 104 or Order XLIII of the Code.

Section 104 provides that an appeal shall lie from the following orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any aw for the time being in force, from no other orders:

1. An order under S. 35-A, i.e., in a case where compensatory costs in respect of false or vexatious claims or defense have been awarded;
2. An order under S. 95, i.e., in a case where compensation for obtaining arrest, attachment or injunction on insufficient grounds has been awarded;
3. An order under any of the provisions of the Code imposing a fine or directing the arrest or detention in the civil prison of any person except where such arrest or detention is in the execution of a decree; and
4. Any order made under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules.
5. Under the amended provision, an appeal shall also lie from an order under S. 91 or S. 92 refusing leave to institute a suit of nature referred to in S. 91 or S. 92, as the case may be. No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section.

Order XLIII Rule 1 also enumerates several categories of orders which are appealable.

Where any order is made under the Code against a party and thereupon any judgment is pronounced against such party and a decree is drawn up, such party may, in an appeal against the decree, contend that such order should not have been made and the judgment should not have been pronounced.

In an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should, or should not, have been recorded. (Order XLIII, Rule 1-A).

Review

Section 114 of the Code defines Review, It says that, if a person considers himself aggrieved

• By a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this code, but from which no appeal has been preferred.
• By a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this code
• By a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,

May apply for a ‘review’ of judgment to ‘the Court which passed the decree’ or made the order, and the court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.

The primary difference between the appeal and review is that the former is filed in the appellate court where the appeal of the suit is allowed to be filed, while the latter is filed in the same court which decreed/ordered the suit.

Review of an order/decree is a discretionary right of the court and not statutory right.

The purpose of the review is a rectification of an order which stems from the fundamental principle that the justice is above all and it is exercised only to correct the error which has occurred by some accident, without any blame (Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai & Ors., AIR 1941 FC 1).

Order 47 of the Code mentions grounds for review.

• When new and important matter or evidence is discovered which after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge, or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree or order was passed;
• When there is any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
• When there is any other sufficient reason.

In State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Kamal Sengupta & Anr. (2008) 8 SCC 612, the Apex court held that, review on the ground of discovery of new and important matter or evidence can be taken into consideration, if the same is of such a nature that if it had been produced earlier, it would have altered the judgement under review and Court must be satisfied that the party who is adducing the new ground was not having the knowledge of the same even after exercise of due diligence and therefore, it could not be produced before the Court earlier.

The error apparent signifies an error that is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. In case the error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of review.

There is no provision of reviewing an order ‘already reviewed’, unlike an appeal where there is a provision of the second appeal.

Article 137 of the Constitution confers power on the Supreme Court to review its own judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the Rules made under clause (c) of Article 145. The Power of the Supreme Court, therefore, cannot be curtailed by the Code (Ram Singh and Others v. Union of India, WP 274/2014).

Conclusion

The complex and tangled web of ‘appeal’ is incomprehensible to laymen. The Civil Procedure Code contains procedures which are normally understood by lawyers only. This creates a situation of absurdity, wherein, most of the time, the plaintiff, or the actual applicant, knows his ‘substantive rights’ but does not knows his ‘procedural rights’ or the ways through which he can enforce his rights, i.e. remedies which are provided to him. Hence, the ultimate goal should be to make these laws as simple as they can be understood by laymen.

When a person is unaware of his ‘procedural rights’, his ‘substantive rights’ loses their meaning, as they are denuded of their enforcement. A layman gets entrapped in this web, and ultimately this web takes his life, and he is not able to claim the remedy.

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Sources

• SCC Online
• Civil Procedure Code Book by C. K. Takwani
• The Code of Civil Procedure Book by Dinshah Fardunji Mulla

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